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IntellectualReserve Inc v Robert Sintes
Court of Appeal, CA3 112008, 16 July 2009, Arnold, Ellen
France and Baragwanath JJ; [2009] NZCA 305
This was an unsuccessful appeal from a decision of
Winkelmann J in the High Court allowing registration by
the respondent, Mr Sintes, of a trade mark containing the
words "family search".
The respondent had established a web-based service, called
the New Zealand Family Tracing Service, in 2000. The
service used the domain name www.familysearch.co.nz. In
2005 the respondent applied for a trade mark incorporating
the words "family search" as part of a logo. The appellant,
Intellectual Reserve, was a non-profit corporation of Utah in
the United States, and was closely associated with the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Between 1994 and 2001
Intellectual Reserve registered New Zealand trade marks
using the words "family search", relating to genealogy. Inte
llectual Reserve opposed Ms Sintes' trade mark application
on two grounds, which were also the issues on appeal:
1 Did Mr Sintes' mark satisfy the distinctiveness require
ment of s 181b?
2 If so, would its use be likely to deceive or cause confu
sion in the marketplace contrary to s 171a and
s 251b and c, and consequently s 171b?
The Assistant Commissioner Walden and the High Court
found for Mr Sintes on both issues. Intellectual Reserve
appealed.
Was Mr Sintes' sign distinctive?
The issue of distinctiveness was raised by both the s S
requirement that to be a trade mark a sign must be capable of
distinguishing the goods of one person from those of another
person, and the s 181b requirement that the Commi
ssioner must not register a trade mark that has no distinctive
character. In the Court of Appeal, Baragwanath J noted that
Jacob J has said that there is no material difference in effect
benveen the adverb "distinguishing" in s S and the adjective
"distinctive" in s 181b.1 In Fredco Trading Ltd v Miller2
the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognised the overlap but
said that s 181b was likely to have particular relevance
where the mark may be capable of distinguishing but does
not have inherent qualities that do mark it out as of distinc
tive character, in which case distinctiveness might arise by use
prior to the application for registration.
Baragwanath J considered the meaning of distinctive,
with reference to the dictionary definition and the statute. He
said that the s S requirement that the mark be capable of
distinguishing meant that the mark must at the date of
registration have that as an inherent quality or have it
demonstrated in fact by prior use or other circumstances.3
He said that the requirement in s 181b meant that a sign
which was capable of distinguishing the goods and services
as having a particular trade origin s 5 must actually do so,
it must at the time of the application be of such character as
effects such distinction.
Baragwanath J said that "distinctive" was not defined in
the 2002 Act. Despite changes to the legislation, Baragwanath J
was satisfied that the best test of what form of distinctiveness
was required remained that formulated by Lord Parker in W
and G du Cros Ltd, and quoted by Baragwanath J as:
1 whether the mark..., if used as a Trade Mark, is likely
to become distinctive of the persons so using it. The
applicant for registration in effect says, "I intend to use
this mark as a Trade Mark, i.e., for the purpose of
distinguishing my goods from the goods of other per
sons....
2 whether other traders are likely, in the ordinary course
of business and without any improper motive, to desire to
use the same mark, or some mark nearly resembling it,
upon or in connection with their own goods.
Baragwanath J reviewed the case law, adopting the words of
Jacob J in British Sugar:
If a mark on its face is non-distinctive and ordinary
descriptive and laudatory words fall into this class but is
shown to have a distinctive character in fact then it must
be capable of distinguishing... What does devoid of dis
tinctive character mean? I think the phrase requires con
sideration of the mark on its own, assuming no use. Is it
the sort of word or other sign which cannot do the job of
distinguishing without first educating the public that it is
a trade mark? A meaningless word or a word inappropri
ate for the goods concerned North Pole for bananas can
clearly do so. But a common laudatory word such as
"Treat" is, absent use and recognition as a trade mark, in
itself... devoid of any inherently distinctive character.
1. British Sugar Plc vJames Robertson & Sons Ltd [1996] RPC 281, 305.
2. Fredco Trading Ltd v Miller 2006 11 TCLR 751 at [61]-[62].
3. Adopting the words of Gault J in McCain Foods Aust Pty Ltd v Conagra Inc [2002] 3 NZLR 40, 43 CA.
4. In the matter ofapplications by Wand G du Cros Ltd for the registration oftrade marks 1913 30 RPC 660, 671 HL
Lord Parker.
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Baragwanath J said that the statutory test is to be applied at
the time of the application for registration, and that the
application may be before the goods or services have been
put on the market. Distinctiveness cannot be confined to the
factual position at that point; the crucial question was the
inherent potential of the mark to serve as a distinguishing
feature. The test concerned a fair assessment of the notional
scope of the marlc In relation to the degree of distinctive
capacity required, the Judge said that the second du Cros
factor - the interests of others who may wish to enter the
market would concurrently protect the interests of con
sumers. Competitors may not be inhibited by another's monopoly
of words that would assist communication of the facts re
levant to competition. However, nondescript words or design
would not suffice to license the use of words which by
themselves would not have been permitted. The use of a
disclaimer might also be necessary to avoid any risk of doubt
by the public as to whether a monopoly of use of such words
had been conferred. A further element was the question of
how the trade mark specifications would be construed in
enforcement proceedings. If a narrow construction of a given
mark were to be taken, the risk of unhealthy monopoly by
permitting its registration would be reduced, and vice versa.
The Judge concluded that, for a sign to be distinctive:
a it must not be commonplace, but must be distinctive of
the user;
b it must not infringe the statute;
c it must not be such as other traders are likely to wish to
use for competing goods or services;
d the use of a disclaimer may bear on the acceptability of
a mark;
e there should be a realistic construction of the mark and
its specification in the relevant market.
On the facts, a mark consisting simply of the words "family
search", whether separated or run together, would be non-
distinctive, either in block letters or in cursive form. Func
tionally, it was precisely the language any other person
entering the market for searching family records would wish
to employ, and used alone it would infringe both s S and
s 181d, leading to questions about how Intellectual Reserve
was granted registration on two occasions of a mark consis
ting simply of the words. The issue for rvlr Sintes' mark, then,
was the use of the words within a sign containing additional
features, being a combination of the words with the font, a
koru and arrow. Baragwanath J said that the judgment
cannot be influenced by what its author means by the sign or
what a layman says concerning its legal effect. The test was
one of the perceptions of the average consumer having regard
to the various methods and practice of advertising they are
likely to encounter.6 Such a consumer is likely to perceive a
mark as a whole rather than analyse its various details. Both
the Assistant Commissioner and the High Court found that
Mr Sintes' total mark was distinctive, and Baragwanath J
took that into account in making his own assessment.
Baragwanath J agreed that the mark was distinctive. He said
that, to the eye of an average New Zealand consumer koru!
arrow wrapping around the words "family search" lent the
total sign a distinctiveness which the words alone wholly
lacked. The koru was indicative of a source, a place of origin;
the arrow suggested directed movement. While not obvi
ously suggestive of the words "family search" and thus free
of a criticism of mere descriptiveness their combination with
the words made the total sign capable of being memorable to
a consumer.
Would the use of Mr Sintes' mark be likely to
deceive or cause confusion in the marketplace
contrary to s 171a and s 251b and C?
Baragwanath J upheld the decisions of the Assistant Com
missioner and High Court on the second issue, so that the
appellants were unsuccessful on this ground also.
The Judge reviewed the statutory provisions and relevant
authorities in relation to likely to deceive or cause confusion.
On the facts, the Judge found that the appellant's and respon
dent's marks were registered in different classes. He said that
there was an element of potential overlap in the application
of the respective marks, but Mr Sintes had not infringed any
of the provisions relied upon by the appellant because the
overlap between the fields occupied by him and by Intellec
tual Reserve was simply insubstantial. The fact of the diffe
rent classes, while not decisive, was material to that assessment.
The appellant's marks were registered in relation to genea
logy, and their function concerned searching the past. There
was no element among their specifications of service for
others that would fall within class 45 in which Mr Sintes'
mark was registered. In addition, in relation to the services at
issue here, consumers were likely to exercise care, so that the
possibility of confusion was reduced.
Baragwanath J held that none of the grounds of appeal
applied, concluding that he would dismiss the appeal subject
to imposition of a disclaimer under s 71 of the Trade Marks
Act 2002. The disclaimer was a condition of registration, and
was to the effect that "Registration of the trade mark shall
give no right to the exclusive use of the words "family
search".
Ellen France J, in a separate judgment, agreed with the
conclusions reached by Baragwanath J. Ellen France J said
that in relation to distinctiveness she would respectfully
adopt the reasoning of Winkelmann J, finding that the com
bination of words and devices comprising Mr Sintes' mark
was such as to be capable of distinguishing. In respect to
s 2S1b she said that she agreed with Wirikelmann J's
conclusion that Mr Sintes' mark was not in respect of the
same or similar services as that of Intellectual Reserve. In
respect of s251c Ellen FranceJ agreed with WinkelmannJ
that use by Mr Sintes of his mark in connection with the
personal services he intended offering would not be taken as
indicating a connection in the course of trade between Mr Sintes
and Intellectual Reserve.
ArrioldJ agreed with Baragwanath J in relation to a 181b
and agreed that there should be a disclaimer. In relation to
s 171a and s 2S1b and s 251c he agreed that they
did not operate to prohibit registration of Mr Sintes' mark,
for the reasons given by Winkelmann J.
The appeal was dismissed, and an order made requiring a
disclaimer.
S. Anheuser-Busch Inc v Budweiser Budvar National Corp [2003] 1 NZLR 472 at [3011.
6. Cycling Is. ..Trade Mark Application [2002] RPC 37.
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K-Swiss Inc v Federation of the Swiss Watch
Industry FH
HC, Wellington CIV 2009-485-197,20 July 2009, DobsonJ
This was an appeal against a decision of the Assistant Com
missioner of Trade Marks to uphold two grounds of opposi
tion to the appellant's trade mark application.
The appellant, K-Swiss mc, was a manufacturer of spor
ting, and in particula tennis, apparel and accessories. On
14 August 2006 it applied for registration of the mark
"KSWISS" for goods in class 14, "horological and chrono
metrical instruments; watches". The respondent was the
Swiss watch industry's leading trade association, which defended
its members' interests through, among other things, bringing
legal proceedings to prevent what it perceived to be abuses of
Swiss denominations when used in connection with watches.
The respondent opposed the registration of the mark on
the grounds that registration of the mark would be contrary
to:
1. Section 171a, because use of the mark by the appli
cant would deceive or confuse consumers as to the
origin and quality of goods bearing the mark;
2. Section 1714b, because it would be contrary to ss 9,
10 and 13 of the Fair Trading Act 1986 and commit
the tort of passing off;
3. Section 172, because the application was made in bad
faith; and
4. Section 18, because the mark had no distinctive cha
racter, was not a trade mark and was merely descrip
tive of the goods.
The Assistant Commissioner found that the respondent suc
ceeded in its opposition under s 1714a and also under
s 171b. The respondent did not succeed on s 172 or s 18.
Registration of the mark was refused.
K-Swiss appealed the findings on s 1714a and s 1714b.
Section 171a
The Judge accepted the appellant's formulation of the test as:
Having regard to the reputation acquired by the word
"Swiss", is the Court satisfied that the mark applied for, if
used in a normal and fair manner in connection with any
good covered by the registration proposed, will not be
reasonably likely to cause deception or confusion amongst
a substantial number of persons?
The Judge said that the mark must be compared with the
name "Swiss" as an indicator of geographical origin or
quality of goods, and that "Swiss" encompassed "Swiss
made" and "made in Switzerland". The Judge said that the
relevant "persons", potential buyers of watches, was the
general public, and that the onus was on the respondent to
prove the term "Swiss" had the reputation of an indicator of
geographical origin or quality of goods in the relevant con-
text. This reputation, or knowledge, or awareness must be
"quite substantial",7 and the test was objective. The Judge
reviewed the evidence on reputation, which consisted of
evidence from two experienced retailers of watches, and a
dictionary definition of "Swiss" ns "what is or comes from
Switzerland".
The Judge noted the absence of direct evidence of consu
mers' knowledge,8 but found that this was not fatal.9 The
Judge said that "Swiss" was not an established trade mark,
but instead an established descriptor in common usage, and
that this made the dictionary definition relevant as it pro
vided objective evidence that the word had geographical
connotations amongst the general public. The Judge also said
that the evidence of the watch retailers was relevant, in that it
provided a perspective on what consumers think, and was
evidence that Swiss-made watches were typically luxury con
sumer items, and consumers of such watches were discerning
and chose these watches for quality reasons. The Judge
concluded that the evidence established that the terms "Swiss"
and "Swiss made" had connotations of superior quality and
craftsmanship, when used in connection with watches, and
that such reputation existed in the minds of at least a sub
stantial portion of potential purchasers of watches. The
Judge also observed that the connection between the notion
of "Swiss-made" and watches was so notorious that it could
be the subject of judicial notice, but the Judge elected not to
rely on this as it was a personal and potentially subjective
view of a particular Judge.
The Judge then considered deception and confusion,
saying that the likelihood of deception or confusion was
contingent upon the similarity between the mark and
"Swiss". The Judge adopted the test in New Zealand
Breweries Ltd v Heinekens Bier Browerij Maatschappij 1
1. You must take the two words and judge of them both
by their look and by their sound;
2. You must consider the goods to which they are to be
applied and the nature and kind of customer who is
likely to buy these goods; and
3. You must consider all the surrounding circumstances
and what is likely to happen if each of the marks is used
in a normal way as a trade mark for the goods of the
respective owners of the marks: In re Pianotist Co. s
Application 1906 23 R,P.C. 774, 777.
It was the totality of the impression of a mark being com
pared that was important; the "idea" of the mark may be
significant, pointing either to confusion or helping to distin
guish, and imperfect recollection must be allowed for. The
Judge considered this issue in detail, and concluded that the
mark "K-Swiss" and "Swiss" were similar, and that the
appellant's products would target the same market as buyers
of Swiss watches. This led to the inevitable conclusion that
there was a likelihood that a substantial number of consum
ers would be confused into thinking the appellant's goods
7. Platinum Homes NZ Ltd v Golden Homes 1998
Miller J.
8. As was provided in Valley Girl Co Ltd v Hanama Collection Pty Ltd HC, Wellington CIV 2004-485-2005, 6 April
2005, Miller J.
9. The Judge distinguished this case from British American Tobacco Brands Inc vi NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading
Company MC, Wellington CIV 2007-485-2814, 11 November 2008, Clifford J.
10. New Zealand Breweries Ltd v Heineken's Bier Brouterij Maatschappij NV [1964] NZLR 115.
Ltd MC, Wellington CIV 2005-485-1870, 11 August 2006,
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had a meaningful connection with "Swiss" and its reputa
tion. The Judge said that consumers would at the very least
postulate that the appellant's goods were either manufac
tured in Switzerland, or had predominantly Swiss-made com
ponents, which was not the case. The Judge upheld the
finding of the Assistant Commissioner that s 171a was
made out and this ground of appeal was therefore dismissed.
Section 171b
The Judge then considered
the second ground of appeal,
unders 171b. The appel
lant argued that registra
tion of the mark would not
be contrary to law because
it would not breach ss 9
and 10 of the Fair Trading
Act. The Judge said that
there was commonality
between this and the first
ground of appeal, because
ss 9 and 10 of the Fair
Trading Act referred to mis
leading and deceptive con
duct, which was similar to
the prospect of deception
and confusion ins 171a.
However theJudge said that
the two tests were not exactly
the same.11 The Judge said
that the key substantive dif
ference between the tests under the Fair Trading Act and
s 171a was the degree of risk. Section 9 required a "real
risk" of misleading or deceiving, rather than just a "mere
possibility".12 In contrast, the test for s 10, given the differ
ence in wording, connoted a potential less restricted in scope
than likelihood or probability.13 The Judge also said that ss 9
and 10 were not contingent upon confusion between two
trade marks, nor did there need to be any particular and
individual goodwill attributable to the reason for the confu
sion. This meant that the fact that "Swiss" was simply a
common word rather than the name of another product did
not displace the application of ss 9 and 10. The focus was the
impact of the mark itself on the minds of consumers.
The Judge held on the facts that, given the strength of the
reputation of "Swiss" in relation to watches, the more strin
gent standard required was met, and registration would
breach ss 9 and 10 of the Fair Trading Act. There was a real
risk that consumers, confronted by a watch with the mark,
would be misled into think
ing that the watch was of
Swiss origin or quality. The
prefix "K" was insuffi
cient to negative the pre
dominant idea of "Swiss"
and its reputation in rela
tion to watches. This ground




The Judge went on to con
sider a proposed agreed alter
native basis for registration,
in the event the appeal was
unsuccessful. Theparñes pro
posed that the Court exer
cise its powers under s 40
ofthe Trade MarksAct 2002,
and allow the mark to pro
ceed to registration, sub
ject to a condition limiting the use of the marks to goods that
were made in Switzerland, or substantially made there so as
to qualify under Swiss law for use of the designation of
"Swiss made". The Judge held that the objectionable ele
ments would be entirely removed by the addition of the
geographical restriction contemplated. The Judge ordered
that the Trade Mark Application proceed to registration,
subject to that condition.
11. The Judge referred to New Zealand Milk Brands Ltd v NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading Co HC, `Wellington CIV-2007-
485-2485, 28 November 2008, Dobson J.
12. Bonz Group Pty Ltd v Cooke [1994] 3 NZLR 216.
13. Sound Plus Ltd v Commerce Commission [1991] 3 NZLR 329, 333.
The Judge held
given the strength
on the facts that,
of the reputation of
"Swiss" in relation to watches, the
more stringent standard required was
met, and registration would breach
ss 9 and 10 of the Fair Trading Act.
There was a real risk that consumers,
confronted by a watch with the mark,
would be misled into thinking that
the watch was of Swiss origin or
quality.
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